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Abstract
Contrary to the assumption of insider~outsider theories, trade
unions, in particular in corporatist countries, do appear to care about
unemployment. In this chapter it is discussed whether the interaction of a
government which cares about unemployed and their income maintenance and
wage setting trade unions which care about unemployed, can, under tradi-
tional institutional arrangements, result in excessive unemployment and an
inefficient allocation. It is shown that an efficíent allocation can be
achieved, if the government and the trade unions can conclude binding con-
tracts regarding benefits, taxes and wage rates, if the trade unions
become responsible for the income of the unemployed or if the government
can pursue a binding wage-guide policy. It is also discussed in this cli~ip-
ter whether the optimal contract is sustainable as a reputational
equilibrium, i.e. how corporatism can be explained and why it could break
down.
~ The author would like to thank Professor van de Klundert for useful com-
ments on a previous version of the paper, Aart de Zeeuw for help on some
technical points and Rick van der Ploeg for his persistent non-
understanding which finally helped to clarify various issues.3
1. Introduction
In various highly unionized countries high unemployment seems to have be-
come a normal feature of the economy rather than an exceptional situation
(Bruno and Sachs 1985, Newell and Symons 1987, Calmfors and Driffill
1987). This phenomenom of structural unemployment has been attributed by
sorne authors to excess.ive power of insiders in wage setting combined wit.h
a high correlation between employment status and insider status (Lindbeck
and Snower 1987a, 1987b, Blanchard and Summers 1987, Carruth and Oswald
1987); due to cooperation and harassment activities, hiring and firing
costs and other sources of power, employed are, possibly in an organized
fashion, able to demand wages above market-clearing level. If employed
basically care about themselves, they will indeed demand such wages and
thereby reduce employment opportunities for outsiders. Other authors have
pointed to a high degree of sluggishness in labour demand (Alogoskoufis
and Manning 1988) or to efficiency wage arguments (Akerlof and Yellen
1986, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984); employers drive, in their attempt to
achieve efficiency gains, wages above market clearing level.
The relevance of these theories for the explanation of unemployment
in highly unionized countries, especially the corporatist ones, may be
questioned, however. Efficiency wage arguments can explain unemployment in
general, but they cannot in particular explain the relatively high un-
employment levels in strongly unionized countries. The basic assumption of
the insider~outsider approach, that employed and their trade unions do not
care about outsiders (often the long term unemployed), is questionable. In
many corporatist countries wage setting is dominated by trade unions,
which derive their power to a large extent from legal arrangements. The4
power in wage setting is bestowed upon them in a tradition of respon-
sability, responsability for the general welfare and certainly the
position of the long term unemployed. One could argue that there are no
outsiders in a corporatist country. And indeed, centralized trade unions
in corporatist countries do appear to care both in word and deed about the
unemployed. They argue in favour of higher unemployment benefits and often
favour programs which aim at the reduction of long term unemployment, for
which they often pay in terms of forgone pay rises. Nevertheless persist-
ent excessive unemployment is observed in many of these countries. The
interesting question can therefore be raised how structural unemployment
can result in an economy with caring trade unions. In this chapter it is
discussed whether the unemployment problem could result from the non-
cooperative interaction of a government which cares about unemployed and
their income maintenance and wage setting trade unions which too care
about unemployed. So unlike the insider~outsider approach which emphasizes
the uncaring nature of the employed and their trade unions, this chapter
takes as a starting point trade unions which do care about unemployed. It
will be discussed whether measures such as (re)introducing wage-guide
policies, contracts between the government and the trade unions regarding
benefits, tax rates and wage rates or other changes in the institutional
arrangements can contribute to alleviate the unemployment problem and can
yield efficient outcomes. In order to be able to deal with these issues,
this chapter focusses on the interdependence between the trade unions wage
setting and the government's benefits and tax rate setting policies.
The set up chosen in this chapter is one in which a monopoly trade
union sets the wage rate before the firms set the level of employment. The
trade union can therefore be regarded as the Stackelberg leader in the5
game with the firms. The trade union is simultaneously involved in a non-
cooperative game with the government. The latter game involves the
determination of the level of benefits and the tax rate on the side of the
government. The government is the Stackelberg leader in the game with the
trade union. It is therefore the ultimate leader of the game between the
trade union, the government and the firms. This implies that the govern-
ment, although there is no direct form of interaction with the firms, can
influence the behaviour of the firms through the effect of the level of
benefits and the tax rate on the wages set by the trade union.
The same type of utility function is assumed for the trade union and
the government. This starting point is chosen in order to be ableto focuss
on the differences in role between the goverment and the trade union and
the degree of care about the unemployed as the key issues.
Attention is concentrated on a single, large monopoly trade union.
This could be either a trade union federation, an encompassing trade union
or a large centralized trade union. Most results (in particular the
results of section 2 and 3) are equally valid, however, if wages are set
in separate industries by decentralized trade unions (see chapter 2), but
this complication is avoided.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with a risk-
neutral government, while section 3 is concerned with a risk-averse,
caring government. In section 4 it is discussed how the inefficient out-
come of the one-shot game with a risk-averse government, can be overcome.
Changes in the institutional arrangements, and a reputational equilibrium
in a repeated game are considered. Section 5 concludes the chapter.6
2. A risk-neutral government
Consider the following aggregate labour demand curve,
~ - L(w), L'(w)~0 (2.1)
This labour demand curve has the usual property that labour demand ~C, is
decreasing in the gross wage rate w and the property that there exists a
unique positive wage rate, which yields a maximum wage sum, w,~.
2
w-wm~ if áW~-O and dw2 (0 (2.2)
dw
It is hence ruled out that the wage sum goes to infinity if the wage rate
goes either to infinity or to zero. This is a property of labour demand
functions with a constant elasticity different from one. Effectively (2.2)
rules out all labour demand functions which have constant labour demand
elasticities for every wage rate, because a maximum wage sum implies a
unit labour demand elasticity for at least one wage rate
(e --wmaxL~(wmax),L(wmax) - 1) and a declining wage sum implies an
increasing labour demand elasticity at that point
(áWlw-wm~)0). It is as-
sumed that the trade union unilaterally determines the wage rate w and
that labour demand is set by firms which take this wage rate as given. In
other words, the monopoly union model is assumed to apply (McDonald and
Solow 1981).
The trade union cares about income and the level of employment. Suc}i
preferences of the trade union allow for various specific possibilil.i~~~.
regarding its utility function. Here it is assumed that the trade ruiir~n
maximises a utilitarian utility function with respect to the gross wage7
rate and subject to the labour demand curve (2.1) and the condition that
labour demand does not exceed labour supply (R(n) (McDonald and Solow
1y81, Oswald 1982a, 1y85, van der Ploeg 1986, Calmfors and Driffill 1987),
Max U -~u((1-t)w) t(n-.i)u(b), u'~0, u"~0
w
(~.3)
where n denotes the size of the labour force, b the l.evel of real
unemployment benefits, and t the labour tax rate (O(t~l)1 The advantage of
this specification is that it has a micro-economic foundation and can be
deri~~ed from aggregating the preferences of two groups of employed and un-
employed workers with risk-averse (u"~0) or risk-neutral (u"-0)
preferences. In the present context this utility function has the ad-
vantage as well that it can be justified on ethical grounds along the
'Veil of Ignorance' line of Rawls (1973) (Sampson 1983). Abidance by cer-
tain ethical principles could play a role in the allotment of power to
trade unions in corporatist countries. If workers do not know the state of
the world in which they arive, and hence do not know whether they will be
employed or unemployed, they might want to maximise their expected
utility. Since their a priori chance of being employed is R~n and the
chance of being unemployed is (n-~C)~n, the expected utility of the workers
takes the form of (~~n)u((1-t)w) t((n-R)~n)u(b) if their utility depends
on net income only. If the workers are risk-averse, they will attach rela-
tively much weight to income in the situation where they might be
unemployed. This implies sub-utility functions with positive but decreas-
ing marginal utility of income (u')0, u"CO)? Such an expected utility8
function yields equivalent results as the utilitarian utility function
above (2.3).
The monopoly trade union is not just involved in a game with the
firms, but is also involved in a non-cooperative game with the government.
The government is the Stackelberg leader in this latter game and deter-
mines the level of benefits and the tax rate. The assumption of government
leadership is based on the generally observed fact that governments using
their legislative power, can impose restrictions on themselves and others,
which restrictions cannot be changed for at least some time, due to the
time consuming process of law making. The trade union therefore maximises
its utility function taking the policy instruments of the government, the
tax rate and the level of benefits as given. This leads to the following
general first order condition for an optimum for the trade union's be-
haviour,
Uw - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b)] ~ (1-t).~u'((1-t)w) -r}L'(w)- 0 (2.4)
where r} is the Lagrange multiplier for the labour supply condition (R~n),
which indicates the shadow price of labour supply.
Two basic solutions for the trade union's problem can be distin-
guished, an interior solution where labour supply exceeds demand (n~.~) and
the shadow price of labour supply is zero {~-0) and a corner solution,
where labour demand equals supply (.~-n) and the shadow price of labour
supply is positive semidefinite (r}~0). Attention is generally concentrated
on T.he interior solution. Equation (2.3) expresses in thnt cas~ that thc
trade union equates the utility loss [u((1-t)w) - u(b)], for the workers
who become unemployed L'(w), as a result of a rise in the wage rate to the9
marginal gain in utility, (1-t)u'((1-t)w), for the employed, ~, of such a
rise in the wage rate.
The basic characteristics of the trade union's behaviour when the
interior solution prevails, are well known (Oswald 198z, chapter 2). The




crease in the level of benefits makes the trade union demand a higher wage
rate (áb~0), while the tax rate has a positive effect on the wage rate
(át~0) if the sum of the labour demand elasticity (e --wL w) and the
Arrow-Pratt degree of relative risk-aversion (r - Í1-t)wu"((1-t)w))
u'((1-t)w)
exceeds one (etr)1) (see equations (2.6) and (2.~) for more details).
Existence of the interior solution requires as a necessary condition
for a maximum that the second derivative is negative, U ~0. This
~ ~ n-0
condition can conveniently be written as,
Uww~~,-0
-{(1-t).Cu'((1-t)w)~w}{y -2e - r} C 0 if y(2etr (2.5)
where y is u meusure !'or tlie concavity of Che lrabour demcand curvu (~r -
-wL w). The second order condition for an optimum is satisfied if' the
L~(w)
labour demand curve is concave to the origin (ry~0) or if this curve is
convex but not too convex (~)0, but ,yC2etr). It is assumed that the labour
demand curve always satisfies this condition.
The corner solution, though not generally distinguished, is easily
typified. The shadow price of labour supply is positive definite in this
case (~,)0). Equation (2.4) can be solved for the shadow price of labour
supply (n -[u((1-t)w) - u(b)] -[(1-t)w~e]u'((1-t)w)), and the equality
of labour demand and supply, can be used to solve for the labour market.10
clearing wage rate, wmc, which is therefore a function of labour supply,
( n-~C-L ( `"mc ( n ) ) .
The trade union's wage setting behaviour can be summarized in a
function which covers both solutions,
w - min{X[b,t],wmc(n)}
and has the following properties,
aW ax , ,




dt - dt - mc
dX




Whether the interior or the corner solution prevails, depends on the
size of the tax rate, the level of benefits, and the shape of the labour
demand curve and the trade union's sub-utility functions. In general all
the factors, which make the trade union demand a higher wage rate conform
the interior solution, (such as a high level of benefits and a higher tax
rate for etr)1) and a larger labour supply, n, will make an interior solu-
tion more likely and an exterior solution less likely (see equations
(2.6)-(2.8) below).
It may furthermore be noted that whatever the specification is,
there always exist levels of benefits for which the labour supply condi-
tion is not binding (n).i) and the interior solution will prevail. This
comes about because the trade union will always demand a net wage r~te11
which is at least the size of the level of benefits. Proposition 1: given
the tax rate, there always exists a level of benefits for which w)w
mc'
Proof: Uw)0 if (1-t)w-b, so w)b~(1-t) for Uw-O, since Uww(0. For O~t~l
there always exists a b for which w)b~(1-t))w
mc'
It is convenient to define a positive semidefinite level of benefits
for which the labour market just clears (n-R and r1-0), to be called b
mc'
Since there is a different market-clearing wage rate for every size of the
labour supply, there is a range of market-clearing levels of benefits
bmc(n). bmc(n) can hence be solved from equation (2.6) as
wmc(n)-X[bmc(n),t] by noting that n-,~ implies w-wmc(n) and n-0 implies
w-X[b,t], if a positive semidefinite level of benefits exists which solves
this relationship. Proposition 1 implies that for any positive tax rate
smaller tlian one (OCtCl) and for any size of the labour supply, n, there
exists a range of non-negative and feasible levels of benefits (b)bmc) for
which the shadow price of labour is zero and the labour supply condition
is not biting.
As a special case can be distinguished the situation where the trade
union is risk-neutral (u(x)-x) and the level of benefits is zero. Z'his
case yields the interior solution w-wm~ when the labour supply condition
is not biting and the corner solution w-wmc if it is biting. Proposition
2a: IF u(x)-x, L(wmax)~n and b-0, the trade union will set a wage rate
w Pr~oof: Since b-0, it Follows from (2.4) that U-(1-t)~{-etl}-0 for max' w
~,-0. Since O~t(1 and positivity of R is ensured (footnote 1), it follows
that Uw is only zero if e-1. e-1 if
w-wmax
by (2.2). The second order con-
dition is satisfied by (2.2) as well, while n-0 follows from L(w )~n.
max
Qh:D12
Proposition 2b: If u(x)-x, L(wm~))n and b-0, the trade union will
set a wage rate wmc. Proof: From L(wm~))n, L(w)Cn and L'(w)CO follows
that
w)wmc)wmax'
Since UwIn-0-0 for w-wm~ (proposition 2a) and U~ OCO
- ~n-
(2.5) it follows that UwI~-0C0 for any w)wm~. The highest U is therefore
achieved by the trade union when the wage rate is set at its lowest
feasible level, which is wmc. QED
Proposition 2 can be used to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The more risk-averse the trade union is, as measured by the
ratio of the average change in utility caused by a change in the wage rate
and the marginal change in utility, the smaller is the wage rate it sets
for given b and t, provided that w)wmc. Proof: If
u((1-t)w) - u(b) 1
increases c. (1-t)w - b u'((1-t)w) p- w and given b and t, it is
clear from (2.3) that Uw evaluated at Uw-O becomes negative. Since UwwCO,
and b and t are given, a drop in the wage rate is required to make U zero w
again. If w)wmc the wage rate will indeed be reduced. QED.
Having described the trade union's behaviour, attention can be
focussed on the government's behaviour. The government's problem is stated
as follows:
Max V - c (2.9)
b,t
s.t. c - (1-t)w,~ t b(n-~) (2.10)
tw.~ - b(n-~), b)0, 1)t)0 (2.11)13
~- L(w), w- min{X[b,t],wmc)' n- L(wmc(n))
The government is, in this section, assumed to have risk-neutral
preferences and to aim at the maximisation of the consumption of private
sector goods, subject to the government's budget constraint (2.11) (see
e.g. Turnovsky and Brock 1980). It is furthermore assumed that both
employed and unemployed spend all their income, which consists only of
wages and unemployment benefits, on the consumption of private sector
goods. These assumptions imply that the risk-neutral government's objec-
tive ((2.9) and (2.10)) is effectively the same as the trade union's
objective (2.3) if the trade union is risk-neutral (u(x)-x). The basic
difference with the trade union exists hence in the instruments available
(the tax rate and the level of benefits versus the wage rate), the extra
restrictions which the government faces (notably its budget constraint and
the trade union's wage setting behaviour) and in this section, the at-
titude towards risk. The government's budget constraint, equation (2.11),
presumes that the government only taxes labour and spends all revenues on
unemployment benefits. When the government's budget constraint is used to
substitute the tax rate out in the income is consumption equation (2.10),
it follows that consumption is equal to the wage sum (c-w~). This result
comes about because tax revenue from labour income is all spent on un-
employment benefits (equation 2.11), which in turn is spent on consumption
(equation 2.10), So in effect the government maximises the wage bill (wR)
subject to the trade union's wage setting behaviour and the labour demand
curve.
Due to its budget constraint, the government can influence the trade
union's behaviour effectively only by one of its two instruments. When it14
changes the level of benefits, the government also has to change the tax
rate to keep its budget balanced (if unemployment exists). From the
government's point of view, the trade union's behaviour can be described,
as the function of one instrument, the level of benefits, by substituing
the tax rate out in the trade union's wage setting equation (2.6),
w - min{W[b,n],wmc(n)}
with the following properties,
where,
dx ax at
- dW b n - db } dt db ,
Wb - db 1- dx dt - Y Z
dt dw
dX dt
dW b n dt db ~
Wn - dn - 1- dX dt - X Z
dt dw
(2.12)
Y--~[1 - e- r] t eu'(b)~u'((1-t)w) )0 if e~nn~(1-r)
X--~[1 - e- r] )0 if etr)1
and,
Z--(1-t)(~ - 2e - r) 4 W[e - ~(1 - e)](1 - e- r)
Z) 0 if i) 1-r C e C~
or ii) ~ C e C 1-r15
or iii) ~ C e C t~ and y) lte
The important thinQ to note is that a balanced budget increase in the
level of benefits, does not always result in a rise of the wage level
(Wb)0). Although a rise in the level of benefits will make the trade union
raise the wage rate (dX~db)0), the ensuing rise or fall in the tax rate
t t~- .
(dt~db t(dt~dw)(dw~db)) could make the trade union reduce its wage
demands to such an extent that the wage rate falls on balance. More
precisely, the effect of a balanced budget change in the level of' benefits
on the wage rate is positive (Wb)0) if both Y and Z, as defined above, are
positive (or negative). If Y is positive, the marginal utility of the
trade union, Uw, falls after a balanced budget increase in the level of
ax ax at
benefits
(db } dt db ~ 0). Y is positive under the easily satisfied suffi-
cient, con~iit.ion that the labour demand elasticity exceeds one minus the
degree of risk-aversion, multiplied by the rate of unemployment, implying
among other things positivity of Y close to the corner solution. If Z is
positive, a drop in the wage rate is required to make Uw, if it has become
negative by a balanced budget rise in b, zero again. The second order con-
dition for a maximum for the trade union's problem, when the interior
solution prevails (Uww~rf-0(0) is no longer a sufficient condition to
achieve this result. A rise in the gross wage rate might, through a large
rise or fall in the tax rate lead to a drop in marginal utility instead of
a rise. Such a perverse effect does not arise if any of the above stated
three sufficient conditions for Z is fulfilled. It is assumed that no such
perverse effects will occur and that Y is positive, ensuring a positive
Wb'16
Positivity of Wb, the trade uniorr's reaction to a balanced budget
change in the level of benefits, implies among other things that a level
of benefits smaller than bmc(n), will yield the market-clearing wage rate
wmc(n)' So bmc(n) has the property that for any b~ bmc(n), the trade
union sets a wage rate, which is equal to the market-clearing wage rate,
w-wmc(n)' lt follows from the government's budget constraint, that the tax
rate is zero for every market-clearing wage rate. wmc(n)-X[bmc(n),t] can
therefore also be written as wmc(n)-X[max(b,bmc(n)),0].
The government's problem described by equations (2.9)-(2.11) can now
be written in a condensed form as,
Max V- wL(w), w- min{W[b,n],X[max{b,bmc(n)},0]} - G[b,bmc(n),n]
b
(2.13)
which yields the following first order condition for an optimum,
Gb[1 - e]~ - 0
This condition is satisfied if e-1 and~or Gb-O.
(2.14)
Again two basic solutions can be distinguished, which solutions cor-
respond to the trade union's problem, and which will be called likewise,
the interior solution and the corner solution. The interior solution comes
about if e-1 (and hence w-wm~ by (2.2)) and if the function G[b,bmc(n),n]
can yield such a solution w-wm~. Such a solution can be shown to exist if
L(wm~)(n or wmax~wmc(proposition 4 below). The second order condition fora maximum (VbbCO) is satisfied if ~rC2, i.e. if the labour demand elas-
ticity declines when w-wm~ and w increases. From (2.2) follows that this
condition is sntisficd.
Proposition 4: If the trade union is risk-averse, Wb~O and
wmax~wmc(n),
there exists a feasible, positive level of benefits that
makes the trade union set w-wm~. Proof: From proposition 3 follows that
the trade union desires a wage rate smaller than wm~ if it is risk-averse
and b-0, provided that w)wmc(n). From Uw~O if (1-t)w-b and Z)0 (Wb~O) fol-
lows w~b(1-t) and hence that the desired wage rate goes to infinity if b
becomes large and t gets close to 1. Since Wb is positive and the wage
rate is continuous in b there exists some finite b for which w is set at
wmax
by a risk-averse trade union. QED
The corner solution comes about if Gb is zero. This is the case if b
is smaller than bmc, because the function G[b,bmc(n),n] is then equivalent
to w-X[max{b,bmc(n)},0] which has the property that dwmc~db-0 for b(bmc so
Gb-O for bCbmc. For bCbmc the function G[b,bmc(n),n] yields wmc as a
solution. This solution constitutes a maximum for the government's objec-
tive if the second order condition is negative.
Vbb b(bmc - Gbb(1-e)I~Ib~bmc
is negative if Gbb)0 and e)1 or GbbCO and eCl.
So if the trade union is risk-averse the government is able to pose
its will completely on the trade union by manipulating the level of
benefits; when
wmc~wmax
the maximum feasible wage sum is achieved at w-wmc
and the government will set bCbmc' When wmc~wmax the maximum wage sum is18
achieved at w-wm~ and the government sets the level of benefits at a
positive level (proposition ~4).
The same conclusion can be drawn for the special case that the trade
union is risk-neutral, except for the fact that the government sets the
level of benefits exactly to zero when w ~w . From propositions 2a fol- mc max
lows that the trade maximises her goal by setting w-wm~ for
wmax~wmc
when b-0. This point can also inferred by noting that substitution of b-0
and from (2.11) t-0, in the trade union's objective (2.3) when the trade
union is risk-neutral (u(x)-x) yields U-w.~. In other words, the trade
union's goal becomes the maximisation of the wage sum w~, which is equiv-
alent to the government's goal, when benefits are zero. By setting the
level of benefits to zero, the government therefore induces the trade
union to set the wage rate such that the government's objective function
is maximised. In case w~w , the government can also achieve this goal mc max
by setting the level of benefits at a positive level smaller than or equal
to the market clearing level of benefits, b
mc'
The intuition behind the result that a risk-neutral government can
make a risk-neutral or risk-averse trade union set the wage rate it
prefers, is that the use of the government's instrument, the level oF
benefits is free. A risk-neutral government can set the level of benefits
at any level without incurring any costs in terms of its utility, so it
can use this instrument solely for the purpose of manipulating the trade
union. Since the trade union will set the wage rate such that wL(w) is
maximised if the level of benefits is set to a non-negative level, the
government can do so, and thereby maximise the wage sum and therefore its
utility.19
This situation is illustrated in figure 2.1 in w,b space. The trade
union's wage setting behaviour when the interior solution prevails, is
summarized in the w-W[b,n] curve. This curve crosses the w-w line at a max
positive level of benefits if the trade union is risk-averse (proposition
4) and at a zero level of benefits if the trade union is risk-neutral
(proposition 2a). The w-W[b,n] curve lies more towards the right, the more
risk-averse the trade union is (proposition 3). Not all points on the
w-W[b,n] curve are feasible solutions, due to the labour supply
constraint. This is illustrated in figure (2.2), where a horizontal
w-wmc(n) line is drawn for a particular size of the labour supply, which
for the purpose of this illustration is chosen such that w~w . The
mc max
w-G[b,bmc(n),n] curve is the w-W[b,n] curve truncated for bCbmc and is
drawn for a risk-averse trade union. The government's iso-utility curves
are also drawn in figure (2.2). These iso-utility curves are straight
horizontal lines, because the government only cares about the size of the
wage sum, and the size of this sum depends on just one variable, the wage
rate. The maximum government's utility is achieved at w , the wage rate
max
that maximises the wage sum. The government therefore chooses the level of
benefits at the point where the w-G[b,bmc(n),n] reaction curve crosses the
line of its bliss points, the w-wm~ line. This results in an equilibrium
.
E, which equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In figure 2.3 the same curves are
drawn as in figure 2.2, but now taking w~w . The maximum government's mc max
utility is now achieved at any level of benefits smaller than or equal to
bmc. When the trade union is risk-averse the solution is only for b-bmc
Pareto efficient.
Insert figures 2.1-2.3 herezo
It may be noted that if the government's goal is to maximise output
instead of consumption (2.9), the government would prefer the corner solu-
tion to the interior solution, if as usual output increases with labour
ínput. To achieve this aim (make the trade union set wmc), the government
would set a level of benefits smaller or equal than bmc. If a positive bmc
does not exist, for example when w )w and the trade union is risk- max mc
neutral and the w-W[b,n] curve hence does not cross the horizontal w-w
mc
line, the government would set the level of benefits to zero and in that
way achieve the lowest feasible wage rate and thereby maximum feasible
output.
3. A risk-averse government
In the previous section the insight was obtained, that a simple private
sector consumption maximising government facing a simple budget con-
straint can manipulate a risk-neutral or risk-averse trade union to set
the wage rate it prefers. Now a commonly observed element of the real
world is introduced, namely the fact that besides providing a means of in-
come for the unemployed, the fight against unemployment itself is
generally regarded as a task of the government; the rate of unemployment
often features as a main issue in the elections. In this paragraph atten-
tion is therefore focussed on a government with risk-averse preferences.
In order to concentrate on the effects of the differences in the
roles of the government and the trade union, it is convenient to model the
government's goal in basically the same way as the risk-aversion of the
trade union (see equation (2.3)). The government's goal is therefore
stated as,21
Max V- ~v((1-t)w) t(n-~)v(b), v')0, v" CO
b,t
(3.1)
s.t. tw~ - b(n-~), ~- L(w), b~0, l~t)0
n-L(wmc(n))~ wmc(n)-X[bmc(n),07.
w-min{W[b,n],X[max{b,bmc(n)},0] - G[b,bmc(n),n]
It may be noted that if the government is risk-neutral (u(x)-x), the
utility function (3.1) yields the government's utility function of the
previous section (equation (2.9), with equation (2.10) substituted out).
To analyze the solution to this Stackelberg problem, it is con-
venient to characterise the command optimum first. If the government is in
absolute command and is able to dictate not just the level of benefits but
also the wage rate, it faces the following optimization problem,
Max V - ~v(w-~b) t (n-~)v(b)
w,b
(3.2)
s.t. ~ - L(w), OCbCw~~(n-~)
n-L(wmc(n)). w)wmc
where the tax rate is substituted out using the government's budget con-
straint, equation ( 2.11). Maximisation of equation (3.2) with respect to
the level of benefits yields, v'((1-t)w)-v'(b) and hence b-(1-t)w.22
Maximisation of equation (3.2) with respect to the wage rate yields for
b-(1-t)w either w-w (for w ~w ) or w-w (for w ~w ). max max mc mc max mc
From the first order conditions for an optimum therefore follows
that the solution to this command problem is to set the wage rate such
that the wage sum, wL(w), is at its feasible maximum and to set the level
of benefits such that this level is equal to the net wage rate (b-(1-t)w).
In a situation where the government is able to issue binding wage-guide
lines one would therefore expect to observe net benefit levels at com-
parable levels as net wages, provided that effective labour supply is
sufficient. Surprising as this might seem, such a situation could actually
be observed, namely in the Netherlands in the seventies (..). Naturally if
the unemployed are regarded by the government to derive an extra positive
(or negative) source of income, z, from the situation compared to employed
people, for example in the form of extra leisure, the sub-utility function
for the unemployed (v(btz)), will be different and the level of benefits
will be set at a smaller level than the net wage rate (b-(1-t)w-z).
Generally the government is not in a position to command the wage
rate ít prefers. In case the government is the Stackelberg leader in the
game with the trade union, as in the situation described by (3.1), it has
to take account of the effects of the level of benefits (and thereby the
tax rate) on the wage level.
As was shown in the previous section, a risk-neutral government sets
the level of benefits at some positive semidefinite level, smaller than
b-(1-t)w, and thus makes the risk-averse trade union set the wage rate at
wm~ or wmc. Now if the government is risk-averse too, this outcome is no
longer optimal from her point of view. Although the size of the cake is at
its maximum, the ensuing division of the cake is not optimal from the23
point of view of a government that maximises the utility of a risk-averse
consumer. Such a government will prefer higher benefits at the cost of a
reduced size of the cake.
Graphically this point is illustrated in figure 3.1 for w ~w max mc'
The government's íso-utility curves reflect its risk-averse preferences.
If benefits are set at a higher level, that is to say, as long as they are
smaller in size then the net wage rate, the government can forsake some
reduction in the size of the wage sum and attain the same utility level.
The government's iso-utility curves have therefore more or less circular
shapes, with horizontal bending points where the level of benefits is
equal to the net wage rate
(db dV-O-0
-~ b-(1-t)w)). To ensure incentive
compatability the net wage rate has to be equal or larger than the level
of benefits. A b-(1-t)w curve is drawn in the diagram to illustrate this
point. Up to the market clearing wage rate, the tax rate is zero and the
b-(1-t)w curve slopes upwards in a 45o degree angle with the axes. The
b(1-t)w curve passes through the government's command optimum, which is on
the margin incentive compatible, and bends at this point backwards, be-
cause the net wage rate is at its maximum at w if both the budget max
constrainL and the b-(1-t)w equality are to be satisfied. To the right of
the b-(1-t)w curve, the government's iso-utility curves therefore exist,
but they are not feasible since the government is bound by its budget
constraint.
The government, as Stackelberg leader, maximises its utility subject
to the reaction function of the trade union. This reaction function
(w-G[b,bmc(n),n]) crosses the wm~ line at a positive level of benefits
for
wmc~wmax
(proposition 4) and slopes upwards (Wb~O) under the assump-
tions made in the previous section. The government chooses the level ofz4
benefits such that the indifference curve closest to its bliss point is
tangent to the w-G[b,bmc(n),n] reaction curve. This results in an
equilibrium ES In the Stackelberg equilibrium ES the slope of the govern-
ment's iso-utility curve is equal to the slope of the trade union's
reaction function. The gross wage rate in this equilibrium is likely to be
higher than the wage rate in the situation where the government is risk-
neutral, wm~, if the slope of the government's iso-utility curve is in
~
this equilibrium E larger than the slope of the trade union's reaction
function. The formal condition for this is derived in Appendix A.
Insert figure 3.1 here.
The Stackelberg equilibrium, Es is not Pareto optimal. Both the
trade union and the government could do better by contracting a smaller
gross wage rate (and a higher level of benefits). The shaded area shows
all the Pareto superior combinations for the special case that the trade
union's and the government's sub-utility functions coincide (u(x)-v(x)).
Ec denotes the government's command optimum. The command optimum is t}ie
only Pareto efficient solution.
It will be clear that unemployment, (n-~), exists when the wage rate
exceeds the market clearing wage rate, wmc, and that the unemployment rate
increases with the gross wage rate. Without using a specific demand for
labour function, it is, however, not possible to be more specific about
the level of the market clearing wage rate. Notably it is not possible to
indicate whether the market clearing wage rate is reached at a point were
the elasticity of labour demand lies below or above unity.25
4. Efficient institutional arrangements, corporatism and the breakdown of
a reputational equilibrium
In the previous section it was shown that if the government is risk-averse
and cares about the income maintenance of the unemployed, it cannot attain
the Pareto efficient outcome. In this section it is discussed how this
result can be changed and the Pareto efficient outcome can be achieved.
First of all the bliss point can be achieved by a change in
responsabilities. If the trade union could levy an obligatory tax on the
employed and would be responsible for the income maintenance of the un-
employed, it could effectively achieve the Pareto efficient solution. By
substituting the government's budget constraint (2.11), which becomes the
trrule union's budget constraint, in the trade union's utility function
(2.3) it becomes clear, that the trade union will maximise the wage sum
(w~E) in this case by setting w-w for w )w and w-w for w ~w and
max max mc mc max mc
that. it sets the level of benefits such that it is equal to the net wage
rate (b-(1-t)w). This reshuffling of institutions and responsabilities
thereby deals directly with the problem that creates the inefficiency of
the trade union's Nash strategy: that the trade union does not take ac-
count of the government's budget constraint. Apart from historical and
ideological arguments (regarding for example the democratic nature of the
decisions) it is clear that such a decision runs into the problem that the
government might influence labour supply and thereby the costs for the
trade union of the income maintenance of the unemployed, through its other
policy instruments (regarding for example education, the public sector
labour force and old age pensions).
If the government would take over the wage setting responsabilities
of the trade union, the bliss point could also be achieved. In effect the26
command optimum is made feasible by this change in responsabilities. This
solution has indeed been observed in the form of binding wage-guide
policies, but it seems to have lost much of its popularity. Critics argue
that governments might lack the ability to monitor sectoral developments
to differentiate wages sufficiently according to micro efficiency
requirements. More fundamentally, the wage-guide policies are required to
be permanent. This means that the trade unions loose a major reason for
existence. In effect it therefore is a way of union bashing, however with
the disadvantage of unsufficiently differentiated wages at micro-level.
If the trade union would be the Stackelberg leader of the game, the
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to E~ This result comes about because
the government's Nash strategy is to equalize the level of benefits and
the net wage rate (b-(1-t)w). If the trade union is the leader of the game
it will not only take this Nash strategy into account but also the govern-
ment's budget constraint (2.11). Zf these relationships are substituted
out in the trade union's utility function it is clear that the trade uníon
sets the wage rate such that it maximises the wage sum and therefore the
same outcome as the government's command situation results. However,
leadership itself is not a choice variable but the outcome of the underly-
ing structure of the game. Trade union leadership requires for example
that trade unions conclude binding wage agreements before the government
implements its (annual) budget policy. In the absence of binding wage con-
tracts (e.g. the UK situation), trade union leadership seems impossible,
while in the presence of binding contract possibilities, longer term (for
example bi-annual) contracts are required to give the trade unions a lead
over the government (see Hersoug 1985). The trade unions need furthermore
to be well organized and behave as an encompassing or centralized tradeunion, because non-cooperative decentralized trade unions, would neglect
the effect of their wage rate on the tax rate and the level of benefits
through the government's budget constraint and therefore set a higher wage
rate than the Pareto optimal wage rate (see also chapter 2).
Naturally the Pareto efficient situation can be achieved as well by
arranging a contract regarding the level of benefits, the tax rate and the
wage rate between trade union and government. Such contracts are hardly or
not observed, however, though in some instances governments do take part
in central wage negotiations and do commit themselves towards certain
policy actions, for example regarding scocial security, in exchange for
wage moderation on behalve of the trade union. The explanation for not ob-
serving explicit contracts could be that they are regarded as
unconstitutional, since a proper contract would concern a long, in
principal indefinite period, which implies that future, not yet elected
governments, are bound too. The status of the government as law maker
could also make it hard to make contracts formally binding for the govern-
ment, and certainly future governments.
Another way to overcome the inefficient outcome results if the
government's command optimum is sustainable as a reputational equilibrium
(Qarro and Gordon 1983), noting that the tax and wage setting game is
played repeatedly in reality. The essential question is whether the incen-
tive which the trade union has to deviate from the Pareto efficient
government's command optimum (the incentive to cheat) is larger than the
punis}iment the trade union perceives to receive from the government if it
does deviate from that outcome. The incentive to cheat can be calculated28
by comparíng the trade union's utility under cheating with the utility un-
der compliance. The increase in utility for the trade union in case it
cheats arises because the gross wage rate is increased, while the tax rate
and the level of benefits stay at the level that balances the government's
budget in the Pareto efficient situation. In case the trade union is risk-
neutral, the incentive to cheat can be calculated as,
B - Uch - Up - (1-tp)wch~ch } bp(n-~ch) - (1-tp)wp~p - bp(n-Rp)
- (1-tp)(wp-wch)~ch (4.1)
where wch is set by the trade union such that e~h --(1-w~h), and w- p p -
w
wm~. The superscript p denotes variables that prevail in the Pareto effi-
cient command optimum, while the superscript ch denotes variables at their
cheating level. The cost of cheating for the trade union depends on the
punishment strategy of the government and the discount rate at which the
trade union discounts the the punishment, which punishment inevitably
takes place after the cheating. Generally the government's pun.ishment
strategy will consist of several elements. One element has to do with the
fact that the government's budget constraint is not satisfied in the
period the trade union cheats, which implies that the government has to
make up in a later period for the deficit run in the first period. The
size of the government's deficit, including interest payments at a rate r,
due to the trade union's cheating can be calculated as,
K - (ltr)Ctpwp~p -
tpwch~ch }
bp(~p-~ch)~ (4.2)29
If this deficit is recuperated, this results in a utility loss for the
trade union of (1-b)K, where b is its discount rate, even if the game
returns to the strategy that corresponds to the Pareto efficient outcome.
The balance of the utilíty loss and the gain from cheating is then,
B - (1-b)K - wch~ch - (1-b)(ltr)wp~Cp - (1-tp)(1-b)(ltr)wp,~ch
- (1-b)(lar)tpwch~ch (4.3)
which simplifies in case the interest rate and the discount rate are the
same to,
B - (1-b)K - wch~ch -
wp~p ~ 0 (4.4)
whir~h is negat.ive. In other words, cheating does not pay for the trade
union if the government recuperates the deficit it has run due to the
trade union's cheating, and the trade union's discount rate is smaller
than or equal to the interest rate on government debt.
Another element in the government's punishment strategy will be a
change in its equilibrium strategy, away from the government's command
optimum. Such a change will make it even less attractive for the trade to
cheat, especially because the effect of the first punishment element is
strengthened.
So it seems likely that the government's command optimum or a point
close to the command optimum is sustainable as a reputational equilibrium.
What are possible reasons for the collapse of a reputational equi-
librium, provided that it exists. One important reason might be that the30
equilibrium is not incentive compatible for decentralized trade unions be-
cause punishment is much less likely to be executed if just one
decentralized trade union deviates from it, since the government has only
general punishment instruments available and cannot single out the members
of the cheating trade union or its reference group for punishment. This
implies that the reputational equilibrium is only possible if there exists
a single large centralized trade union or if the trade organization in
which the decentralized trade unions are combined is very disciplined.
Another reason that the reputational equilbrium ceases to be sus-
tainable is that the credebility of the government's punishment strategy
declines, because it becomes harder to execute the punishment strategy. If
there is no economic growth, the punishment requires a reduction in the
real net wage rate and the real level of benefits. It will be easier to
reduce the relative size of benefits and increase the tax rate if wages
are growing due to a high rate of underlying economic growth. Clearly
economic growth facilitates punishment by reducing its political costs,
since in a world of imperfect knowledge part of the electorate will not
realize that these punitive actions by the government are in their best
interest.
5. Concluding remarks
It was shown in this chapter that a risk-neutral government, which cares
about unemployment, can achieve a Pareto efficient outcome, by manipulat-
ing the trade union through the use of the level of benefits, but that a
risk-averse government, which cares about unemployed, cannot achieve the
unique Pareto optimal outcome in a one shot game when trade unions set the
wage rate, despite the fact that the trade unions too care about the31
unemployed. This result implies under certain conditions higher unemploy-
ment than a non caring government can achieve. A number of options are
examined, which could help to overcome this problem. The options involve a
change in institutional arrangements, either voluntary (the trade union
takes over the responsability for income maintenance of the unemployed,
binding contracts between the trade union and the government) or involun-
tary (wage-guide policies or union bashing). The Pareto optimal outcome is
in principle sustainable as a reputational equilibrium in a repeated game.
But this requires a well organized and disciplined trade union and a rate
of economic growth that makes punishment by the government politically
feasible.32
APPENDIX A
The gross wage rate in this equilibrium is likely to be higher than the
wage rate in the situation where the government is risk-neutral, w if
max'
the slope of the government's iso-utility curve is in this equilibrium E~
larger than the slope of the trade union's reaction function.
Formally this implies,
dw I ~ dW b n I
db dV-O,w-wm~ db w-wm~
The first term takes the following form,
dbldV-O,w-wm~ - w(~){v'(b) - v'((1-t)w)}~
(A1)
{[v((1-t)w)-v(b)] - R[(1-t)w-b]v'((1-t)w)} (A2)
which is positive due to the risk-averse nature of the government's
preferences. In case the trade union's sub-utility function, u(x), is
equal to the government's sub-utility function, v(x), this term simplifies
to,
dwl n-.~ u'-(b) - u' ((1-t)w) ~ 0




using the fact that Uw-O, n-0 and e-1 in E. The second term, the slope of'
w
the trade union's reaction curve in E, is a simplified version of equa-
w




w-wm~ - -[(1-t)(á-2-r) t b]ru~((1-t)w)
w
(A4)
From equations (A4) and (A3) can be inferred that the condition for a
tiigher wage rate in case the government is risk-averse, equation (A1) is
fulfilled if,
n-,~ u'(b) - u'((1-t)w) ~ u'(b) t~ru'((1-t)w)
~ b -[(1-t)(~-2-r) t b]r
w -w
(A5)
which is the case if ,y is rather negative.34
Footnotes
1. In order to ensure that equation ( 2.2) yields a solution where the wage
rate is not smaller than the level of benefits, it is required that
labour demand is positive when b-(1-t)w; L(b~(1-t))~0 or L(w)~0 for
b-(1-t)w. This is assumed to be the case.
2. In the extreme case of infinite risk-aversion, Rawls's maxi-min
criterium results.
3. Note that the aim of the government is the same as the trade union's
aim, if the trade union is risk-neutral and the tax rate in the trade
union's utility function is substituted out. In achieving its goal the
government has to take account of its budget constraint and the trade










Figure 2.1 Trade union's wage setting behaviour
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Figlire 2 2 Risk-neutral government and trade union's wage setting be-













Figure 2.3 Risk-neutral government and trade union's wage setting be-







Figure 3.1 Risk-averse government and risk-averse trade union37
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